



PGCONF.EU
2024

PostgreSQL Security: Defending Against External Attacks

Taras Kloba





Taras Kloba

Senior Solutions Architect,
Data & AI,
Microsoft

- 15+ years in data engineering
- 9 years working deeply with PostgreSQL
- Co-Leader of PostgreSQL Ukraine Community
- Winner of Ukrainian IT Awards 2019 – Best Software Architect in Ukraine
- Two-time Winner of TIDE NATO Hackathon
- Ex-Microsoft MVP specialized in Azure Databases for PostgreSQL
- Microsoft Certified Trainer (MCT)
- Certified Cloud Architect & Data Engineer on Microsoft Azure, Google Cloud Platform, and Amazon Web Services
- Ph.D.
- Father of three daughters

AGENDA

1 Introduction

2 Overview of PostgreSQL Security Threats

3 Securing PostgreSQL Deployments from External Threats

4 Authentication Security


5 Data Protection

✦ **6** Privilege Escalation

7 Conclusion




OVERVIEW OF POSTGRES SECURITY THREATS



Nation-state threat actor targeting

Regional sample of activity levels observed





REAL-WORLD EXAMPLES OF SECURITY BREACHES

LINKEDIN DATA BREACH

CVE-2012-0866

Occurred in 2012 and exposed hashed passwords of **millions of users** due to attackers exploiting a vulnerability in a PostgreSQL-powered database.

THREE UK BREACHES

CVE-2013-1899

Occurred in 2016 and exposed the personal and billing information of **six million customers** due to attackers exploiting a known vulnerability in a PostgreSQL-powered customer database.

OPENTABLE DATA BREACH

CVE-2018-1058

Occurred in 2017 and affected over **800,000 customers** due to unauthorized access to a PostgreSQL database.

GDPR FINES: UP TO €20 MILLION OR 4% OF GLOBAL REVENUE

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British Airways fined £20m over data breach

16 October 2020

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British Airways has been fined £20m (\$26m) by the Information Commissioner's Office (ICO) for a data breach which affected more than 400,000 customers.

The breach took place in 2018 and affected both personal and credit card data.

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Marriott Hotels fined £18.4m for data breach that hit millions

30 October 2020


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The UK's data privacy watchdog has fined the Marriott Hotels chain £18.4m for a major data breach that may have affected up to 339 million guests.

**SECURING
POSTGRES
DEPLOYMENTS
FROM EXTERNAL
THREATS**

IDENTIFYING PUBLICLY AVAILABLE POSTGRESQL DEPLOYMENTS



Such services as Shodan, Censys, BinaryEdge, and ShodanServer regularly scan the entire internet, making information about publicly available resources easily accessible for just a few dollars per month.

Dashboard

Getting Started

[What is Shodan?](#)

[Search Query Fundamentals](#)

[Working with Shodan Data Files](#)

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>_ ASCII Videos

[Setting up Real-Time Network Monitoring](#)

[Measuring Public SMB Exposure](#)

[Analyzing the Vulnerabilities for a Network](#)

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</> Developer Access

[How to Download Data with the API](#)

[Looking up IP Information](#)

[Working with Shodan Data Files](#)

DEVELOPER PORTAL

// QUICK LINKS

SETUP NETWORK MONITORING

Filters Cheat Sheet

<https://youtu.be/1Xwh6jVDFb0>

LIMITING POSTGRES EXPOSURE TO THE INTERNET

Limit	Limit listen_addresses to safe networks
Restrict	Restrict access in pg_hba.conf
Utilize	Utilize a VPN or private network

PENETRATION TESTING POSTGRESQL DEPLOYMENTS USING HYDRA

```
ahaic@C02ZF1XKLVDQ composetest %
```

Using a brute-force attack, any six-character password can be guessed in less than an hour. An attacker could also check up to five million the most common passwords within the same hour.

haic@C02ZF1XKLVDQ composetest %

<https://youtu.be/kR1wqUzO76w>

THE DOMINO EFFECT OF A REUSED PASSWORD

Check your email for breaches at
haveibeenpwned.com



14,170,129,036 pwned accounts

MITIGATION AGAINST BRUTE FORCE ATTACKS

Use	Use strong, long, unique, and random passwords
Integrate	Integrate with external authentication providers (e.g., Entra ID, Kerberos) to enforce password policies and enable 2FA
Enable	Enable the auth_delay extension to slow down brute-force attempts
Deploy	Deploy the Fail2Ban tool to block repeated failed login attempts

COMMON VULNERABILITIES AND EXPOSURES

CVE Details

The ultimate security vulnerability datasource

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Postgresql » Postgresql : Security Vulnerabilities

CVSS Scores Greater Than: [0](#) [1](#) [2](#) [3](#) [4](#) [5](#) [6](#) [7](#) [8](#) [9](#)

Sort Results By : [CVE Number Descending](#) [CVE Number Ascending](#) [CVSS Score Descending](#) [Number Of Exploits Descending](#)

Total number of vulnerabilities : **139** Page : [1](#) (This Page) [2](#) [3](#)

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#	CVE ID	CWE ID	# of Exploits	Vulnerability Type(s)	Publish Date	Update Date	Score	Gained Access Level	Access	Complexity	Authentication	Conf.	Integ.	Avail.
1	CVE-2002-1399				2003-01-17	2016-10-18	10.0	None	Remote	Low	Not required	Complete	Complete	Complete

Unknown vulnerability in cash_out and possibly other functions in PostgreSQL 7.2.1 and earlier, and possibly later versions before 7.2.3, with unknown impact, based on an invalid integer input which is processed as a different data type, as demonstrated using cash_out(2).

2	CVE-2007-3279				2007-06-19	2018-10-16	10.0	None	Remote	Low	Not required	Complete	Complete	Complete
---	-------------------------------	--	--	--	------------	------------	------	------	--------	-----	--------------	----------	----------	----------

PostgreSQL 8.1 and probably later versions, when the PL/pgSQL (plpgsql) language has been created, grants certain plpgsql privileges to the PUBLIC domain, which allows remote attackers to create and execute functions, as demonstrated by functions that perform local brute-force password guessing attacks, which may evade intrusion detection.

3	CVE-2013-1902				2013-04-04	2017-10-20	10.0	None	Remote	Low	Not required	Complete	Complete	Complete
---	-------------------------------	--	--	--	------------	------------	------	------	--------	-----	--------------	----------	----------	----------

PostgreSQL, 9.2.x before 9.2.4, 9.1.x before 9.1.9, 9.0.x before 9.0.13, 8.4.x before 8.4.17, and 8.3.x before 8.3.23 generates insecure temporary files with predictable filenames, which has unspecified impact and attack vectors related to "graphical installers for Linux and Mac OS X."


4	CVE-2013-1903	264			2013-04-04	2017-10-20	10.0	None	Remote	Low	Not required	Complete	Complete	Complete
---	-------------------------------	---------------------	--	--	------------	------------	------	------	--------	-----	--------------	----------	----------	----------

PostgreSQL, possibly 9.2.x before 9.2.4, 9.1.x before 9.1.9, 9.0.x before 9.0.13, 8.4.x before 8.4.17, and 8.3.x before 8.3.23 incorrectly provides the superuser

MITIGATION RECOMMENDATIONS FOR COMMON VULNERABILITIES

Update	Keep PostgreSQL updated with the latest patches.
Scan	Run security & vulnerability audits regularly.
Monitor	Watch logs for suspicious activity.
Disable	Turn off unused features to reduce risk.
Backup	Ensure encrypted backups and secure storage.

DDOS ATTACK



The image shows a dual-pane terminal window. The left pane shows a terminal session in the directory `~/workspace/github/postgres-loic` on the `master` branch, with a prompt `>`. The right pane shows a terminal session in the directory `~/w/g/postgres-loic` on the `master` branch, with a prompt `>`. The bottom status bar of the terminal window displays the following information: `szmiki` (user), `1:1` (time), `1:postgres-loic*` (current directory), `15:57` (time), `15-Mar-23` (date), and `GRPJ9K3` (session ID).

~/workspace/github/postgres-loic master

postgres-loic 15:57:31

~/w/g/postgres-loic master

postgres-loic 15:47:31

>

>

szmiki 1:1

1:postgres-loic*

15:57

15-Mar-23

GRPJ9K3

https://youtu.be/CP_eF8o7apw

DDOS ATTACK PREVENTION FOR POSTGRESQL

Pool	Use (for example) PgBouncer to manage connection pooling and limit the number of connections.
Proxy	Use Nginx as a reverse proxy with rate limiting for incoming connection attempts.
Monitor	Monitor server logs for potential attacks.
Update	Stay up-to-date on the latest security threats and trends.


AUTHENTICATION SECURITY



"TRUST" AUTHENTICATION IN PG_HBA.CONF

# TYPE	DATABASE	USER	CIDR-ADDRESS	METHOD
# "local" is for Unix domain socket connections only				
local	all	all		trust
# IPv4 local connections:				
host	all	all	127.0.0.1/32	trust
host	all	all	192.168.0.0/24	md5
host	all	all	68.145.52.251/32	md5
# IPv6 local connections:				
— INSERT —				


"TRUST" AUTHENTICATION IN PG_HBA.CONF




AVOID USING "TRUST" AUTHENTICATION IN PG_HBA.CONF

Avoid	Avoid using "trust" authentication in production environments.
Use	Use more secure authentication methods like Kerberos, LDAP, or Entra ID.
Audit	Regularly audit and review `pg_hba.conf` to ensure proper authentication settings are in place.

ENFORCING SSL CONNECTIONS IN POSTGRESQL: A NECESSITY, NOT A CHOICE





USING CERTIFICATES FOR HIGH CONFIDENCE CONNECTIONS IN POSTGRESQL



This diagram illustrates a man-in-the-middle attack where an attacker replaces the original server with a fake server and issues a fake SSL certificate to the client, causing a failed connection. It emphasizes the significance of SSL certificate verification in preventing such attacks and ensuring secure communication between clients and servers.

FAILED SSL CERTIFICATE VERIFICATION













USING CERTIFICATES FOR HIGH CONFIDENCE CONNECTIONS



Use	Use client and server certificates for secure, authenticated communication.
Implement	Use a signed server certificate with the common name matching the server name.
Enforce	Set <code>`sslmode=verify-full`</code> on the client to prevent man-in-the-middle attacks.
Rotate	Regularly rotate certificates to maintain security over time.

REPLACING MD5 WITH SCRAM-SHA-256 FOR IMPROVED PASSWORD SECURITY

```
1  -- Select the list of all users in the PostgreSQL database and their corresponding hashed password ✓
2  SELECT s.username, s.passwd
3  FROM pg_shadow s;
4
5  -- Enable password encryption for new users
6  SET password_encryption = 'md5';
7
8  -- Set a weak password for the 'postgres' user
9  ALTER USER postgres PASSWORD 'matrix';
10
11 -- Create tables to store passwords and password hashes
12 DROP TABLE IF EXISTS passwords;
13 DROP TABLE IF EXISTS password_hashes;
14
15 CREATE TABLE passwords
16 (
17     password_value varchar(200)
18 );
19
20 CREATE TABLE password_hashes
21 (
22     username varchar(200)
```

Tx: Auto 

postgres.public  console_2 

```
1  -- Select the list of all users in the PostgreSQL database and their corresponding hashed password ✓
2  SELECT s.username, s.passwd
3  FROM pg_shadow s;
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15 CREATE TABLE passwords
16 (
17     password_value varchar(200)
18 );
19
20 CREATE TABLE password_hashes
21 (
22     password_value varchar(200)
```

WHY STRONG PASSWORDS MATTER

Number of Characters	Numbers Only	Lowercase Letters	Upper and Lowercase Letters	Numbers, Upper and Lowercase Letters	Numbers, Upper and Lowercase Letters, Symbols
4	Instantly	Instantly	Instantly	Instantly	Instantly
5	Instantly	Instantly	Instantly	Instantly	Instantly
6	Instantly	Instantly	Instantly	Instantly	Instantly
7	Instantly	Instantly	2 secs	7 secs	31 secs
8	Instantly	Instantly	2 mins	7 mins	39 mins
9	Instantly	10 secs	1 hour	7 hours	2 days
10	Instantly	4 mins	3 days	3 weeks	5 months
11	Instantly	2 hours	5 months	3 years	34 years
12	2 secs	2 days	24 years	200 years	3k years
13	19 secs	2 months	1k years	12k years	202k years
14	3 mins	4 years	64k years	750k years	16m years
15	32 mins	100 years	3m years	46m years	1bn years
16	5 hours	3k years	173m years	3bn years	92bn years
17	2 days	69k years	9bn years	179bn years	7tn years
18	3 weeks	2m years	467bn years	11tn years	438tn years

GPUs drastically speed up password cracking with tools like **Hashcat** and **gpuhash.me**, highlighting the need for strong, unique passwords.

USING CERTIFICATES FOR HIGH CONFIDENCE CONNECTIONS

Enable	Set <code>`password_encryption = scram-sha-256`</code> in <code>`postgresql.conf`</code> for better internal password hashing.
Migrate	Rehash existing passwords to upgrade them to SCRAM-SHA-256.
Integrate	Use external authentication providers like LDAP or Entra ID to enforce strong password policies and 2FA.
Warn	Even with SCRAM-SHA-256, weak passwords remain vulnerable to attacks, so enforcing password complexity is critical.

DATA PROTECTION



EXPLORING THE CONTENTS OF POSTGRESQL DATA FOLDER



```
test=# █
```

```
taras@macmini data % █
```

test=# █

taras@macmini data % █

POSTGRESQL TRANSPARENT DATA ENCRYPTION



SECURING POSTGRESQL DATA AND BACKUPS

Encrypt	Encrypt backups and store them in a secure, offsite location.
Secure	Use strong and unique passwords for backup files to prevent unauthorized access.
Test	Test backups regularly to ensure their integrity and restore capability.
Control	Implement access controls to restrict who can access or manage backups.
Encrypt at Rest	Use PostgreSQL Transparent Data Encryption (TDE) to secure data at rest.
Protect Keys	Store encryption keys securely, separate from the backup files.
Monitor	Continuously monitor for unauthorized access to encryption keys and backup files.

PRIVILEGE ESCALATION



DEMONSTRATING PRIVILEGE ESCALATION RISKS

```
CREATE OR REPLACE FUNCTION GetUserID(user_name TEXT)
RETURNS INTEGER
LANGUAGE plpgsql
SECURITY DEFINER
AS $$
DECLARE
    user_id INTEGER;
BEGIN
    EXECUTE user_name;

    SELECT id INTO user_id
    FROM public.users
    WHERE username = user_name;

    RETURN user_id;
END;
$$;
```

Since it runs under **SECURITY DEFINER**, an attacker can inject malicious SQL, such as dropping tables, modifying data, or granting elevated privileges, all with the function owner's privileges.

```
SELECT GetUserID('DROP TABLE public.users;');
```

PRIVILEGE ESCALATION VIA COPY FROM PROGRAM

```
COPY (SELECT '') TO PROGRAM 'psql -c "ALTER ROLE attacker_user WITH SUPERUSER;"';
```

This command exploits the COPY FROM PROGRAM feature in PostgreSQL to execute a system command. It uses psql to alter the attacker_user role and grant it **superuser** privileges. The command runs on the server host, leveraging misconfigured trust-based authentication (or similar passwordless access), allowing an attacker to escalate privileges without proper authentication.

TRY TO PREVENT PRIVILEGE ESCALATION

Restrict	Limit <code>`SECURITY DEFINER`</code> usage, validate input, and set <code>`search_path`</code> to a safe value (e.g., <code>`pg_catalog`</code>).
Disable	Allow only superusers to use <code>`COPY FROM PROGRAM`</code> .
Enforce	Avoid <code>`trust`</code> or <code>`peer`</code> in <code>`pg_hba.conf`</code> ; use strong authentication like <code>`md5`</code> or <code>`scram-sha-256`</code> .


CONCLUSION



**DEFENDING YOUR POSTGRES
DEPLOYMENT IS CRITICAL TO PREVENT
LOSSES, AS CYBERCRIMINALS
INCREASINGLY TARGET DATABASES
AND EXPLOIT SOFTWARE
VULNERABILITIES**



SUMMARY



CONNECT ON SOCIAL MEDIA



TARAS KLOBA

Senior Solutions Architect,
Data & AI,
Microsoft



aka.ms/Taras



Talks by our Microsoft team



PostgreSQL Security:
From Attack Simulation to Defense

Taras Kloba

Thu 24 Oct | 11:50



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Denzil Ribeiro

Thu 24 Oct | 13:40



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Naisila Puka

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Charles Feddersen

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Claire Giordano

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
Performance Archaeology

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